I found that some provisions tended to indicate that the authorities had fallen back on the old way of thinking. Instead of creating new mechanisms to ensure the protection of human rights, they acted in conflict with the requirements of a human rights culture. In doing so the government threatened rather than served the values of an open democratic society based on freedom, security and equality. This is unfortunately still the position today.
While the many problematic aspects remain some 15 years later I only revisit two aspects in this article. The first aspect is the burden bestowed on the applicant for bail with regard to certain serious offences to convince the court that the interests of justice permit his release. The second aspect is the fact that the testimony of the applicant for bail is admissible as evidence at his later criminal trial. While each of these aspects gives reason for concern on their own, I also allude to the fact that the cumulative effect of the two aspects, and the exploitation thereof by the prosecution under South African law, are of even more concern.
Because it is of theoretical and practical value to see how other -proven‖ democracies deal with the issues, I consider and compare the South African position with that of Canada, the United States of America and the Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales. I also investigate whether the domestic jurisdictions are in line with two prominent international human rights instruments, to wit, The European Convention on Human Rights, 13 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 14 The domestic jurisdictions that I have selected are apposite for comparison in light of the fact that the law of criminal procedure and evidence in these jurisdictions and in South Africa are premised on the same English common law principles. The systems are therefore based on the same fundamental principles, and the underlying rationale or reasoning for their existence similar. Because the Australian federal courts do not hear serious crimes, and the reverse onus provisions with regard to 13 An international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. It came into force in 1953. Any person who is of the opinion that one of his rights in the treaty has been violated may take the member country to the European Court of Human Rights. See European Convention on Human Rights, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Convention_on_Human_Rights (last visited 12 July 2013). 14 The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General assembly in 1966 bail are typically bestowed on the applicant for bail for serious crimes, I have chosen the states of Queensland and New South Wales for comparative purposes.
All of these societies also profess to constitutional liberalism that value the principles including openness, democracy, human dignity, equality and freedom that are protected in the South African Constitution.
With regard to the reverse onus provisions I show that the provisions are not in line with the values and principles that have long been held by the international community to be necessary in an effective democratic society based on the rule of law. I submit that this restraint on individual liberty is misplaced under South African law and not justified in the other jurisdictions discussed. I argue that the applicant for bail in South Africa should not be burdened with an onus. I point out that in respect of the admissibility of incriminating evidence from the bail hearing at trial, the South African government does not share the same appreciation for due process than the inherited English common law, the other proven jurisdictions or the international paradigms that are discussed. I argue that it was unwise for the South African legislator to impose a broad and radical inclusionary policy to something that should be treated selectively. I submit that where an applicant for bail is required to incriminate himself directly or indirectly in pursuance of his quest to obtain bail, he must be protected against the use thereof at trial. I point out that none of the proven democratic jurisdictions and international paradigms that have been discussed provide for a reverse onus when adjudicating bail, and the blanket admission of the evidence at the criminal trial. I submit that the cumulative effect of these provisions, and especially so the exploitation thereof by the South African prosecution, is a failure of liberal democracy. I argue that the situation must be corrected to reflect an adequate concern for the welfare and autonomy of the accused.
THE REVERSE ONUS PROVISIONS
Section 60(11) 15 provides that:
Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with an offence referred to -(a) in Schedule 6, 16 the court shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that exceptional circumstances exist which in the interests of justice permit his or her release; (b) in Schedule 5, 17 but not in Schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that the interests of justice permit his or her release.
The locus classicus with regard to the constitutionality of many of the issues regarding bail under South African law is the 1999 decision by the Constitutional The South African Constitution does therefore not have to provide for a right to bail, and if it provides for such a right, it does not have to confer a basic entitlement to
bail.
Yet, it is accepted that bail or pre-trial release plays a role in all common law jurisdictions and it is recognised at international level. It has also widely been held that there is a close connection between the presumption of innocence and the other criminal procedure rights, including the right to bail. 22 In terms of this view the presumption of innocence has benefitted accused persons for a long time by acting as an animating principle throughout the whole criminal justice process.
In a fundamental rights dispensation the presumption of innocence is discounted in every provision impacting on the criminal justice process, and its operation at the different stages of the criminal process is described by the different protected rights. 23 Seeing that section 35(1)(f) applies to -[e]veryone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence‖, and the accused has therefore not been convicted, one would expect that the due process embodiment of the presumption of innocence would require that one have at least a basic entitlement to bail.
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A -right‖ to bail that does not entitle one to bail but rather sanctions the loss of liberty also does not make structural sense. I suggest that the approach taken by the (2010) . Under South African law there has been disagreement whether the presumption of innocence has application outside the narrow trial context. The establishment of a protected right to be presumed innocent in § 35(3)(h) of the Constitution brought even more uncertainty as to the correct application and scope of the presumption of innocence. A discussion of this aspect falls outside the scope of this article. See chapter 5 of my thesis (supra note 12) for a discussion. In view of the fact that it is only the effect of the presumption of innocence at trial that has been entrenched in § 35(3)(h), it is the common law presumption of innocence that would have to find application to the right to bail in § 35(1)(f), and the other entrenched criminal procedure rights outside the trial context. 23 At first blush one is immediately reminded of some noteworthy domestic jurisdictions that allow for a reverse onus when adjudicating pre-trial release.
Canada is one such example where an accused charged with one of the offences referred to in sections 515(6) and 522(2) must show cause why his detention in custody is not justified within the meaning of section 515(10). 27 Significantly, there were no reverse onus provisions at the time of the introduction of the Bail Reform Political Rights. 40 In terms of Article 9(1) 1) everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person; 2) no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention; and 3) liberty shall also only be deprived on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. Article 9(3) provides that pre-trial detention shall not be the general rule, but rather the exception. 41 Here too, I submit that the Article properly construed and applied, require that the prosecution justify remand in custody. Logic dictates that the prosecution would have to prove that the circumstances of the accused are exceptional, justifying continued detention.
What then, may be asked, happened in the domestic jurisdictions that allow for reverse onus provisions for certain offences or offenders with regard to the pretrial release? In South Africa rampant crime and a criminal justice system which is not up to the task of effective crime management led to the widespread criticism of and disillusionment with the criminal justice system. In reaction to the criticism and in an attempt to make the system work individual civil liberties were eroded by government. In the other domestic jurisdictions discussed above the instances where a reverse onus is mandated also seems to indicate that concerns about collective security played an important role in the restraining of individual liberties.
Proponents for the reverse onus will remind that fundamental rights are not absolute and must be weighed against the legitimate needs of society (for security).
However, I submit that this restraint on individual liberty is misplaced under South
African law, and not justified in the other jurisdictions discussed above.
In South Africa the police force and prosecution are severely constrained by corruption and a lack of expertise. This will forge a playing field where there would be no need to weaken individual rights to make the system work.
With regard to the other domestic jurisdictions discussed above, there is simply no need for reverse onus provisions to ensure an acceptable level of security. 43 These jurisdictions have effective systems of policing and prosecutors which give the prosecution a powerful advantage over the accused. Burdening the prosecution with the onus of justifying continued detention for all applicants for bail will not disturb the balance to such an extent that the system will be ineffective. It is reasonable to theorise that in these jurisdictions other considerations also play a role. Confirming this, some observers have indicated that the rights of accused persons have been side-lined in the Canada and the USA to curry favour with the voting public. 44 Nonetheless, the biggest concern with a reverse onus provision is probably the real risk of a lack of meaningful judicial review when pre-trial release is adjudicated. It is therefore an issue about fairness. In this regard the judicial control brought about by the presumption of innocence where the guilt or innocence of an accused is decided is informative. The presumption of innocence ensures that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused. In this process the prosecution, with access to the resources and machinery of the state, must take care that justice is done. 45 There is clear authority that this minimises the risk that the accused will be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Based on the same reasoning it follows that where the accused is burdened with the onus to justify pre-trial release, the lack of input by the prosecution and/or the inability of the accused to properly present or illicit the necessary material for consideration, may lead to the accused being erroneously detained pending his trial. 46 In view of the gravity of being detained, this lack of judicial control amounts to an unjustified lack of respect for the individuals' liberty.
In South Africa this situation is exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of individuals who appear before the criminal courts do not have the means to afford legal representation. The state-funded system of counsel also does not adequately protect accused against injustice. 47 In many instances the state appointed attorney only sees the client for the first time minutes before the trial starts. 48 To make matters worse the law regarding bail is complex, and with regard to many aspects, unclear under South African law. 49 Under such conditions a reverse onus is discriminatory and unfair against the poor, with the unintended consequence that the poor are more likely to remain in custody pending the finalisation of the criminal process.
The South African government will argue that the lack of, or inadequate representation is compensated for by the active inquisitorial role 50 that have been conferred upon the court in bail proceedings by section 60. 51 In terms of this section, if the question of bail is not raised by the accused or the prosecutor, the court shall ascertain from the accused whether bail should be considered by the court. 52 The 46 It is clear that where the onus of proof rests on the accused, the testimony by the state and the role of the investigating officer will be of secondary importance. All that is needed is for the state to oppose the granting of bail. If the state opposes bail it is up to the accused to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that he should be released on bail. It is presumable because of exactly this that some courts have been creative in applying the onus in terms of § 60(11). In Sv Branco 2002 1 SACR 531 (W) at 532f the court held that the fact that the accused was saddled with the onus did not mean that the state can remain passive and not adduce evidence, or sufficient rebutting evidence, in the hope that the applicant will not discharge his onus. court may in respect of matters that are not in dispute obtain in an informal manner the information that is needed to make a decision or order. 53 The court may in respect of matters that are in dispute require of the prosecutor or the accused, as the case may be, that evidence be adduced. 54 Where the reverse onus applies and the prosecutor does not oppose bail, the court must require the prosecutor to state the reasons for not opposing bail. 55 If the court is of the opinion that it lacks the necessary information or evidence to reach a decision on the bail application, it must order that such information or evidence be placed before court. The value of conferring an inquisitorial role on the court is furthermore hamstrung by the fact that the lack of expertise and integrity has due to the same unrealistic employment policies also found its way to the bench. 57 Given the lack of expertise and integrity, the inquisitorial elements in the bail process do not provide the safety net that the legislator had probably hoped for.
My argument against this lack of judicial control is furthermore strengthened by the fact that for those who have been refused release, the period of incarceration 53 § 60(2)(b pending trial is frequently excessive in South Africa. Such is the problem that it is not uncommon for an accused to remain in custody for many years pending the finalisation of the criminal proceedings.
58
The argument is also strengthened by the fact that the prisons in South Africa are notoriously unsafe, 59 overcrowded and the conditions deplorable. 60 Hence, incarceration pending the determination of guilt should only be ordered if absolutely necessary.
In light of the above-mentioned it is important that there should be meaningful judicial review when deciding pre-trial release. An accused should not have to convince the court that the interests of justice permit his release.
THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICANT FOR BAIL AT THE LATER CRIMINAL TRIAL
58 See e. The record of the bail proceedings, excluding the information in paragraph (a), 64 shall form part of the record of the trial of the accused following upon such bail proceedings: Provided that if the accused elects to testify during the course of the bail proceedings the court must inform him or her of the fact that anything he or she says, may be used against him or her at his or her trial and such evidence becomes admissible in any subsequent proceedings.
Critics of the section point out that the accused has a constitutional right to remain silent 65 and a constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also has a constitutional right to bail. 66 The applicant for bail is now faced with a dilemma. If he fails to give evidence, or refuses to answer incriminating questions at the bail application he may be refused bail. In the instance of the more serious offences where he has the burden of proof, he will be refused bail if he does not give evidence or answer incriminating questions. 67 In view of the fact that the record of the bail proceedings form part of the record at trial, the applicant for bail is therefore forced to 61 Introduced by way of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 85 of 1997. 62 This is somewhat narrower than the privilege inherited from English common law which provided that an accused may not be conscripted (in any given procedure) to give evidence (and not only to provide an answer) that may be used to incriminate him at trial. 63 Criminal Procedure Act. The section commenced on 1 August 1998 by way of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 85 of 1997. 64 -(11B)(a) In bail proceedings the accused, or his or her legal adviser, is compelled to inform the court whether-(i) the accused has previously been convicted of any offence; and (ii) there are any charges pending against him or her and whether he or she has been released on bail in respect of those charges.‖ 65 § 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. 66 § 35(1)(f) id. 67 He may elect to submit evidence by affidavit. However, because the evidence in the affidavit cannot be tested by cross-examination the probative value is less than that of oral evidence, placing the applicant at a disadvantage.
give up his constitutional right not to incriminate himself, in order to exercise his constitutional right to bail. 68 In my view the criticism loses sight of the fact that an important purpose of the right to silence is to protect the accused against self-incrimination, and that the applicant for bail does not always have to divulge facts of the case to obtain bail. See my discussion of the principles below. The applicant for bail of course also has another option. He may choose to lie at the bail application. However, he then risks conviction and punishment for perjury. 69 See supra note 8. 70 It is beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed discussion of the Constitutional Court judgement or all the provisions and principles that have to be considered under South African law when deciding whether § 60(11B)(c) passes constitutional muster. In addition section 5(2) of the Canada Evidence Act 75 protects an accused at the criminal trial from an answer given at the bail hearing, where he objected to answer the question on the grounds that the testimony might tend to incriminate or establish his liability in a civil proceeding. In terms of this section the answer may therefore also not be used to test the credibility of the accused during crossexamination at trial. It does not cover the testimony which the applicant voluntary chooses to submit in order to obtain bail, whether he is saddled with the burden of proof or not.
In American society the right against self-incrimination has also been regarded as worthy enough to be protected in the United States Constitution. accused against the compulsion to answer a question that may tend to incriminate him, it is not as clear whether the accused can still find protection under the wider common law privilege where he is conscripted against himself, other than in response to a question. This is very relevant in the present context where the applicant burdened with the onus has limited options but to testify, in order to show cause why he should be released from detention.
It has been held that due to the significance of the privilege as a substantive right, the policy of law favours immunity from self-incrimination. 96 It has also been held that the courts will only interpret legislation to have abrogated the privilege if the intention to do so is clearly apparent from the legislation. 97 Even if applying this approach, the Act was probably intended to act as the complete code with regard to the rules of evidence in Queensland, and section 10 ostensibly limits the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to questions asked.
Unfortunately there is no case law to indicate how the courts have applied section 10 with regards to the admission of incriminating evidence from the bail hearing at trial. However, where the answer to a question at the bail application might tend to incriminate, the applicant for bail will clearly be faced with the same dilemma of having to choose between refusing to provide information and risk being refused release, and providing evidence of guilt and risk conviction. I such event the trial court has the power to exclude the incriminating evidence, 98 if the court is satisfied that it would be unfair to the person charged to admit the evidence. 99 In New South Wales section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 100 provides for a -[p]rivilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings‖. 101 The first five subsections provide for a step by step process. A witness may object 102 to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence under Australian or foreign law, or is liable to a civil penalty. 103 The court must then determine whether there are reasonable grounds for the objection. 104 If the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court shall not require the witness to give evidence. 105 In such event the court must inform the witness that he need not give evidence, and that if he willingly gives evidence, the court will issue a certificate under section 128. 106 The court must also inform the witness of the effect of the certificate.
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If the court is satisfied that the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty, under a law of a foreign country, and that the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence, the court may require the witness to give the evidence.
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In both instances the court must cause the witness to be issued a certificate. 109 The court must also issue the witness with a certificate if the objection has been overruled, and after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection.
110
Evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate is issued, and evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person giving evidence, cannot be used against the person.
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This applies despite any challenge, review, quashing, or calling into question on any ground the decision to issue a certificate, or the validity of the certificate.
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Despite the wording of section 128(1) it appears from the case law that section 128 protection only extends to answers that are elicited. It also appears that it only extends to answers elicited by someone other than the witnesses' counsel. In
Song v Ying
113 the New South Wales Court of Appeal explained that when a witness who is party to a proceedings is asked questions by his own counsel, whether in chief or in re-examination, there would -rarely if ever be a question‖ that that evidence is given under compulsion. The court also held that a witness who wishes to give evidence in response to questions from his own counsel, but is not willing to do so, except under the protection of a section 128 certificate, does not -object‖ within the meaning of section 128(1). The court indicated that only questions from anybody else than his own legal representative makes sense of the word -objects‖ in section 128, and -require‖ in section 128(4).
Unfortunately there is also no case law to indicate how the New South Wales courts have applied section 128 with regard to the admission of incriminating evidence from the bail hearing at trial. However, the practical operation of section 128 in the context of bail can be illustrated by using three examples. Assume for each example that the applicant at the bail application objects to answer a question emanating from someone else than his own legal counsel on the basis that the answer might incriminate him.
In the first example the court upholds the objection by determining that there are reasonable grounds for the objection. The court informs the applicant for bail that he can choose to give evidence but need not do so. The applicant answers the question because he wants to be released on bail. The court must give the applicant a certificate and explain its effect. The evidence, as well as any evidence derived from the evidence, cannot be used against the accused at trial.
In the second example the court rejects the objection. The applicant must answer the question. A certificate is not issued and the applicant does not enjoy any protection.
In the third example the court upholds the objection and finds that the held that -it seems .. to be a matter of common sense that reasonable grounds for an objection must pay regard to whether or not the witness can be placed in jeopardy by giving the particular evidence.‖ The courts have also long held that the mere fact that the witness swears that the answer will incriminate him is not sufficient, the court must be satisfied from the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the evidence that the witness is asked to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness, if he is compelled to answer.
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As far as international human rights instruments are concerned, the right to silence and the right against self-incrimination were surprisingly not expressly taken up in the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the European Court of
Human Rights has in a number of decisions interpreted Article 6, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, to include both these rights describing them as -generally recognised international standards lying at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure.‖ In terms of English common law an accused may not be conscripted (in any given procedure) to give evidence that may be used to incriminate him at trial.
Canadian law provides even better protection in that incriminating evidence given freely or under compulsion at the bail hearing may not be used to incriminate that witness at the later criminal trial. Under American law the Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. It is therefore clear that with regard to the admissibility of incriminating evidence from the bail hearing at trial, the South African government does not share the same appreciation for due process than the inherited English common law, the other -proven‖ jurisdictions or the international paradigms discussed above.
This abrogation of generally vaunted standards and principles is not acceptable in a constitutional state based on respect for our common humanity and commitment to the rule of law. In my view there is also very little difference (if any) in principle between being compelled to incriminate oneself at the bail application, and allowing the evidence against one at the trial, and being compelled to incriminate oneself during the actual criminal trial. In both instances the accused is obliged to assist the state in proving the case against him. Yet, the privilege is treated as sacrosanct with regards to evidence emanating from the accused at trial under South African law. 119 I suggest that in the present context the following are the realities and the correct application of the principles. It is not uncommon for the facts of the case to come up for discussion during the bail application. In the majority of these instances the apparent strength of the state case becomes a factor to be considered by the presiding officer in deciding whether to release the applicant on bail. The prosecution in opposing bail may try to show that on the face of the material before court, it has a strong case. A strong case makes a conviction likely, and if a substantial prison sentence is probable upon conviction, this may sway the court to come to the conclusion that the accused may flee rather than stand his trial. 120 To counter this, the applicant for bail must point out the weaknesses in the state case.
At the other end of the spectrum, if the state case is weak, it is incumbent on the applicant, especially where he is burdened with the onus, to show that the state case is weak, making conviction improbable, and absconding for that reason unlikely. 121 It is furthermore evident, that in a specific case, the circumstances may be such that only the applicant personally, will be able to provide such proof.
Another problem is that the applicant for bail may not be fully aware of all the allegations of fact that will be made against him at trial. 122 The charge sheet will in most instances not have been drawn up, or the indictment and summary of the facts will not have been served, 123 and the accused will not have had access to the police docket. The applicant may therefore unknowingly testify about issues at the bail application, that later become relevant at trial.
In both instances the situation is complicated by the fact that it is not only the issues about the facts that constitute the elements of the crime that may later incriminate at trial, but also issues about facts, relevant to facts in issue.
It was accordingly unwise for the South African legislator to impose a broad and radical inclusionary policy to something that should be treated selectively. As far as the principles are concerned, I am of the view that the underlying rationales 124 for the right to silence is not imperilled by the requirement that an applicant for bail should speak. However, where the applicant for bail is required to incriminate himself directly or indirectly in pursuance of his quest to obtain bail, he must be protected against the use of this evidence, or derivative evidence, at trial. The proper time for determining whether the evidence given at the bail hearing can be characterised as incriminating evidence, is when the prosecution seeks to use it at trial. 125 In this way the other evidence against which no objection can be levelled is available for use at the trial.
Yet, of even more concern are the cumulative effect of the reverse onus and the blanket admission of the bail evidence at trial, and the exploitation thereof by the South African prosecution.
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT AND EXPLOITATION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROSECUTION
As explained earlier, it is not uncommon for the strength of the prosecution case to become relevant during the bail application. When the applicant for bail is burdened with the onus, it is up to the applicant to finally satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that he should be released on bail. His testimony or evidence on all issues, including the apparent strength of the prosecution case, is accordingly of primary importance. All that is needed is for the state to oppose the granting of bail.
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Under South African law this evidence, including anything which may incriminate, may then be used against the accused at trial. 127 This is unacceptable in a jurisdiction that professes to be a liberal democracy which is concerned with the 124 The rationales are: concern for reliability, by deterring proper investigation which relates to the truth seeking function of the court; a belief in the dignity and privacy of the individual, while not absolute, may not be lightly eroded; to give effect to the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. (1996) . 127 When the applicant for bail had been warned of his privilege against self-incrimination.
manner in which the verdict is reached and notions of human rights, including the dignity and personal autonomy of the accused. It is inter alia in recognition of the autonomy of the individual that we do not force him to incriminate himself or to participate at the trial. 128 Confirming this, none of the proven democratic jurisdictions and international paradigms that have been discussed, provide for a reverse onus when adjudicating bail, and the blanket admission of the evidence at the criminal trial.
Unfortunately, the South African prosecution has exacerbated this retrogressive legislative step by exploiting the situation as part of their litigation tactics. It is fair to say that since the introduction of the reverse onus provisions and section 60(11B)(c), not only the factors relevant to pre-trial release have been taken into account by the prosecution when deciding whether to oppose bail. In many instances the real possibility that the accused will be forced to reveal his defence in exposing the weaknesses in the state case during the bail application has swayed the prosecution to oppose bail.
The prosecution is well aware that it is especially with regards to the very serious offences targeted by section 60(11)(a) 129 that the offender is in a tight situation. The applicant is not only burdened with the onus, but must satisfy the court that exceptional circumstances exist, which in the interests of justice permit his release. 130 In this regard the South African courts have held that the weakness of the state case alone, 131 or in conjunction with other factors, 132 may establish such exceptional circumstance(s). Due to this the prosecution oppose these applications even though it is unlikely that the accused will not stand his trial, or that one of the other grounds in section 60(4) 133 which do not permit release, will be established.
I have no doubt that this practice amounts to the abuse of the process of the courts. It may even be argued that the legislator must have foreseen the scope for abuse of the provisions, and still passed the legislation. In such event it would clearly also be misuse of state power by government. In a country where the vast majority of its citizens cannot afford legal representation for the trial alone, the accused cannot be forced to incur the expenditure of a formal contested bail application that may last several days, and need not have been held in the first place. This may lead to an accused having to forgo his right to legal representation, or choice of counsel, at a later stage of the process due to lack of funds. Again it is the poor and the destitute that will the most affected.
It is also unacceptable for an accused to have to suffer the rigours of a formal bail application, and run the risk of being incarcerated pending trial, for the very selfish ulterior objective of the prosecution, to get a tactical advantage for trial.
I accordingly submit that the cumulative effect of these provisions, and especially so the exploitation thereof by the South African prosecution, is a failure of liberal democracy. It offends our collective sense of justice and must be corrected to reflect an adequate concern for the welfare and autonomy of the accused. In this exercise, repealing or striking down section 60(11B)(c), which provides for the blanket admission of bail evidence at trial, and an understanding that in specific circumstances an applicant for bail may be forced to provide evidence on the merits of the case in order to secure bail, will go a long way in redressing democratic ideals.
